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BABE : THE TALE OF THE SPEAKING MEAT; PART ll
Val Plumwood
SYNOPSIS OF PART 1: In Part 1, I suggested that the film Babe
provided a valuable context in which to discuss the replacement of the
Cartesian mechanistic model of animals, which has dominated the
industrial world since the Enlightenment, by a communicative model
which is more suited to survival in an ecological age. The film offers a
recognition of communicative virtues and characteristics as central to
both human and nonhuman forms of life, and a vision of the emergence
of communicative forms of relationship as victorious alternatives to
forms based on violence, domination and terror. Focussing on the
paradox of the speaking meat the leading character Babe represents, I
argued that one of the great strengths of the film is that it invites us to
challenge some of the blocks and erasures which support our denial of
the meat animal as a communicative subject. As Babe's drama of
recognition reveals the multiple insensitivities and denials of kinship that
are part of the meaning of meat in our society, we can grasp the
possibility of alternative meanings that recognise food as kin. I outlined
a context-sensitive approach to vegetarianism which refuses cultural
universalism and recognises the radically different ethical meanings meat
can have in different societies. Finally I explored some of the ethical and
political ambiguities of communicative forms, and the tantalising
questions Babe raises about the communicative farm. Will the new
communicative paradigm be used to liberate the sheep and the other farm
animals, or merely to oppress them in more subtle and self-complicit
ways? Will the communicative animal farm stand to the mechanistic
farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal democracy stand
to the more repressive forms of patriarchal-authoritarian governance they
replaced?
NOW READ ON to discover in PART 11 the moral ambiguities of the
human-animal contract, the conceptual traps of pet/meat and person
/property dualism, and why we need a politics of animal justice.
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4: Communication and Anthropomorphism
Babe's opening shot shows Babe waking in communicative interaction
with siblings, expressing sorrow at the loss of his mother and fear as he
is seized and carried away. These are all emotions we can realistically
expect real pigs to feel and express in this situation, and Babe's 'human'
speech as it emerges in this context seems a natural expression of these
emotions, wishes and beliefs. The animal communication introduced here
works well because it continues and extends the normal body language
and communication of the animals. Nevertheless, the representation of
such animal subjectivity in human terms is often said to be irresolutely
problematic and invalidly 'anthropomorphic'. It is worth considering and
clarifying this charge in relation to the representation of animal
communication and subjectivity in works of art. I will argue that there is
no good basis for the general claim that an artwork is invalidated by
anthropomorphism merely on the ground that it attributes subjectivity
and communication to nonhumans. The problems in representing other
species' communicative powers or subjectivities in terms of human
speech are real, but they do not rule out such representation in any
general way, and they pale before the difficulties of failing to represent
them at all, or before the enormity of representing communicative and
intentional beings as beings lacking all communicative and mental
capacity. That is a much greater inaccuracy and injustice than any
anthropomorphism could be.
We need to distinguish various senses of anthropomorphism, including
general and specific senses. The general concept and charge of
anthropomorphism, as Mary Midgley1 has argued, is in its usual sense
and definition thoroughly confused. It is ambiguous as between
attributing to nonhumans characteristics humans have (OED), and
attributing to nonhumans characteristics only humans have. Both senses
are problematic, in slightly different ways, when used to support the
claim that the attribution of characteristics such as subjectivity to animals
must be anthropomorphic.
The first sense, that something is
anthropomorphic if it attributes to animals characteristics humans have,
implies that there is no overlap of characteristics between humans and
nonhuman animals. That is, it assumes a hyperseparation of human and
animal natures and attempts to enforce upon legitimate representations of
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nonhumans such a radical discontinuity. This sense should clearly be
rejected, not only because it is based on a demonstrably false assumption
of radical discontinuity, but because it can be used to delegitimate
virtually any depiction of nonhuman subjectivity that made sense to us.
The second sense of anthropomorphism - attributing to nonhumans
characteristics only humans have - is not open to this objection, but is
open to the objection that its use to delegitimate the attribution of
subjectivity and other contested characteristics to nonhumans is simply
question-begging. It assumes just what is at issue, what opponents of the
mechanistic model contest, that nonhumans do not have characteristics
such as subjectivity and intentionality humans also possess. As Midgley
notes, the focus of this sense of the concept tends to be otiose and
human-centred. If something is to be faulted for attributing to
nonhumans characteristics they do not have, it is sufficient to point out
that this is an inaccurate way of representing them, and the inaccuracy
itself provides (in a suitably veridical context) sufficient independent
ground for rejecting such an attribution. Unless there is a good reason
for addressing the question of similarity to humans, it is simply
anthrocentric to go on to bring every source of comparison and focus of
assessment back to humans and to an animal's similarity or difference
from them, as the concept of anthropomorphism tends to do.
The critic of representing animals in communicative terms often draws
on another sense of anthropomorphism which is closely analogous to the
concept of weak anthrocentrism2, and which, like weak anthrocentrism,
makes it very hard or impossible for representations of nonhumans to
avoid being assigned the label anthropomorphism. This is a weak sense
which locates anthropomorphism in the presentation of animal
communication 'in human terms', from a human conceptual location. Any
representation of the speech-content for a human audience will have to
be an interpretation in terms of human concepts, and in that weak sense,
a background level of anthropomorphism is always likely to be present.
What is much more difficult to demonstrate is that anthropomorphism of
this background kind, in the weak sense of employing a human
conceptual apparatus or conceptual location, is necessarily harmful or
invalidating, or that there are no practices which can counter it.
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Where the charge of anthropomorphism can lead to the application of
more stringent standards to the representation of animal communication
than are used to judge the success of comparable human representation, it
is itself liable to the counter-charge that it is anthrocentric. Arguments of
this kind are often advanced to show that any representation of animal
communication is rendered illegitimately anthropomorphic because of
problems of translation and indeterminacy, although problems are also
familiar in the representation of human cultural difference. There are
parallel difficulties for both cross-cultural and cross-species
representation: a weak cross-cultural analogue to background
anthropomorphism is involved in virtually any translation project, for
example, in any attempt to 'bring over' one culture's forms into another's.
To avoid delegitimating all such attempts, we need to distinguish the
impact of weaker and stronger forms of anthropo- morphism, just as we
need to distinguish weak and usually harmless forms of anthropocentrism
from strong and damaging forms.3 Weak forms are unavoidable but not
necessarily harmful, while strong forms may be damaging but are by no
means inevitable. As with anthro- centrism, the confusion between the
two forms gives rise to the illusion that damaging forms are inevitable.
Once we proceed beyond these weak general senses, the concept of
anthropomorphism is somewhat ill-defined, and the features being
problematised under that description can usually be better characterised
in terms of anthropocentrism rather than anthropomorphism. But in the
same way, the charge of anthropocentrism cannot be used in a
generalised form to delegitimate representations of nonhumans as
communicative subjects. There may still sometimes be a point to the
charge of strong anthropomorphism, but it becomes much harder to
demonstrate. As in the case of weak anthrocentrism, the question is not
whether or not some degree of humanisation of perspective is present in
any particular human representation of animal communication, for it
always will be at the background level, but how damaging it is, what is
its meaning, and what practices can be used to counter it? Since the
inevitable presence of background levels of anthromorphism means that
the charge of impurity can always be raised, it is helpful here to
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distinguish the motives for raising it. Are there ever legitimate problems
the charge points to?
We have seen that a commonplace motivation for raising the charge of
anthropomorphism is a rationalist-Cartesian policing of human-animal
discontinuity, to maintain the human observer's distance from and
indifference to the animal observed. Although there is in response to the
dominant Cartesian-rationalist stress on discontinuity often a need to
provide a counterstress on continuity between the human and animal, the
question of anthropomorphism can often be raised with some greater
validity in the context of the denial of difference which is a key part of
structures of subordination and colonisation to which animals are
subject.4 The charge of anthropomorphism may then legitimately draw
our attention to a loss of sensitivity to and respect for animal difference
in humanisation or in representation. The concern about lack of respect
for difference can extend to cover even well-meaning animal rights
attempts to assimilate animals within the model of the person, in contexts
where there has been no associated attempt to deconstruct the
person/property dualism formative of liberalism.
But there are a host of dangers in this area uneasiness about
anthropomorphism may reflect: the infantilisation of animals which their
insertion into the structures of the private household as pets or their
treatment as adjuncts to human children tends to produce is just one of
the forms of humanisation associated with the structuring of what
domestic animals can become in terms of the limiting slots available for
them in human society. The charge of humanisation can draw attention
to the reduction of the animal which appears in demeaning or
subordinated forms of humanisation. But some kinds of uneasiness
about the influence of the human are less warranted. It is only too easy
to adopt here over-strong criteria which unwittingly re-invest in humananimal dualism through the assumption that the only genuine animal is
the wild animal, the animal completely apart from and uninfluenced by
human society, (just as the only genuine indigene is one who looks and
sounds exactly as before the days of contact). The genuine problem here
is not so much human influence and relationship itself, which is not
inevitably corrupting or demeaning, but the reduction of animals which
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so often accompanies their insertion as subordinates, deviants or
resources into an anthropocentric culture. A solution does not have to try
to maintain or represent an 'ideal' pure animal uninfluenced by
interaction with the human - although every effort should be made to
maintain wild animals in their own ecosystems - but to reach out for
relationships that allow for both species together some kind of fullness of
becoming, or, as Freya Mathews puts it, allows the animal to 'achieve a
significant degree of the form of self-realisation appropriate to its
particular kind'.5 The mixed farm of Babe showed some of the
possibilities here, especially for the working dogs.
A parallel set of issues arise in the case of representation. As in the case
of the human other, so in the animal, such representations must always
raise questions about supplanting and assimilating the other. However
there can be no general argument that such cross-cultural perspectives
presenting another's viewpoint, are deceptive or illegitimate. Crossspecies representation, like cross-cultural representation, is not
automatically colonising or self-imposing, and may express motives and
meanings of sympathy, support and admiration. Rather, specific cases
have to be argued on their merits, not just in terms of the alleged
intrusion of non-indigenous or human impurities, but in terms of the
kinds of insights they present or prevent and the moral quality of their
representation.6 We need to put into place here counter-practices which
oppose colonising tendencies in these contexts.
For example,
representation should keep in mind the distinction between claiming to
be rather than to represent an other's perspective, to see or speak as the
other rather than to see or speak with the other.7 In the case of
translation and indeterminacy, counter-practices could require an effort
to note non-equivalences in forms of life and to treat difficulties about
translation as sources of uncertainty and tentativeness. Using the
problems of such an approach as a model, we might expect an
appropriate methodology for dealing with cross-species conceptual
difference and translation indeterminacy to be one which stressed
corrigibility and open expectations. Dealing with both human and
nonhuman cases of translation indeterminacy requires openness to the
other and careful, sensitive, and self-critical observation which actively
seeks to uncover perspectival and centric biases8.
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So I don't think it can be argued that Babe is lacking in proper respect for
animal difference because it represents animal subjectivity and
communication in terms of human language, any more than it can be
argued that cross-cultural translation is inevitably hegemonic.
Undoubtedly there can be great variations and moral differences here, but
again, we cannot reject as automatically colonising the mixed or impure
perspective which places a human subjectivity into an animal situation.
Indeed, as the Larsen cartoon about why dinosaurs died out
demonstrates, such 'anthropomorphic' transferences of perspective may
be not only funny but philosophically revealing, about ourselves as well
as about the other. They can enable us to enter into, if not the other's
subjectivity, the other's situation, and that can contribute to our
understanding and sympathy. Here, much depends upon the stance the
work takes towards the anthrocentrism it represents: rather than being
the bearer of an insidious and unexamined inferiorisation of the other,
the imposition of an obviously human framework may be the joke, a joke
that is partly on us, and which precisely invites reflection about human
importations.
Cross-species representations then are not necessarily but can be
unacceptably human-centred. Our civilisation is haunted by animal
images, but those images themselves are often made complicit in the
project of subordinating real animals and eliminating them from our
lives. The privileging of the representation of animals over the animals
represented is a widespread form of human-centredness which is
symptomatic of the growing success of the project of human selfenclosure. This danger is especially acute in cases like Babe where films
use living animal actors, rather than more indirect forms of
representation. The animal justice movement has been right to raise
questions about the treatment of animals actors in animal films during
and after film-making, although perhaps less right where it has ignored
the difference between the willing participation of domestic animal
actors and the coerced participation of wild animals, and insisted upon
conditions so stringent that they would prevent any participation of
domestic animals in filmic events.
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The project of human self-enclosure and its privileging of animal
representation over animal lives is routinised in popular representations
of animality. Compare the kind of humanisation displayed in Babe with
the Disney paradigm of humanisation. Disney cartoons, as John Berger
has noted, are usually only superficially about animals; Disney characters
with stereotypical animal bodies often have totally humanised
personalities, frequently incorporate little or no recognisable reference to
the characteristics or situations of the animals represented, and are
permitted no critical reflection on their relationship to the human
community or membership of the mixed community. The animal form
appears in this anthrocentric conception as a nullity which is made to
bear the burden of meanings which have no connection with the animal's
own subjectivity or situation. The Disney paradigm, normalised in
television cartoons, is one in which animals are, in John Berger's words,
'totally transformed into human puppets' whose main role is to naturalise
various hegemonic forms of the human condition by attributing them to
the animal 'kingdom'.9
The erasure of animals in the Disney animal cartoon is objectionable for
reasons that directly reflect its anthrocentrism and its contribution to the
incorporation of the other, in this case expressed in the inability to
encounter the animal respectfully as an independent other who is more
than a disguised form of self. These movements to incorporate the other
also underlie the highly anthrocentric assumption I criticised above, that
an 'animal film' can only be taken seriously to the extent that it is actually
about humans. In contrast, a less anthrocentric and belittling treatment
would take animals seriously as agents, communicative subjects, bearers
of knowledge, and members of the mixed community who are
themselves able to observe us and perhaps to reflect critically on us and
their relationships with us. On these sorts of criteria of anthrocentrism in
the treatment of the animal other, I think 'our Babe' comes out rather
well. 'Eatin' pigs! Barbaric!' exclaims the ewe Maa when she learns of
the Hoggett's intention to eat Babe. The animal gaze, we are reminded,
can also capture and evaluate us.
The criminalised, women, animals - all these are bearers of a denied or
lessened form of subjecthood, which cannot itself command the position
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of knower but which is the object of an arrogant form of knowledge
which so stereotypes and denies their difference and their speech that
they are obliterated as possible subjects of reciprocal exchange or
dialogical encounter. As Foucault notes, to be always under such an
arrogating observation is also the fate of the prisoner, and as feminists
have pointed out, a feminised subjectivity is one in which the subject
internalises such a male gaze. John Berger10 has claimed that this
arrogating conception of the other has now gone so far for animals that
the animal proper is now irrecoverable for us as a possible other for
encounter and communicative exchange. He writes: 'animals are always
the observed. The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance.
They are the objects of our ever-extending knowledge. What we know
about them is an index of our power, and thus an index of what separates
us from them. The more we know, the further away they are'.11 This
diagnosis is acute but perhaps too fatalistic. There are cultural means to
problematise and subvert these anthrocentric conceptions of the animal,
to recover the animal as subject and reciprocal observer rather than as
background, passively observed object; it is encouraging then that in the
final shot of Babe, it is the animal who looks back.
5: Meat and the Colonising Contract
Among the film's other pleasures are the way the lead character Babe,
from his position as speaking meat, systematically disrupts each of the
background assumptions of meat I identified in Part 1. In the initial
scenes of the film, we have (briefly) to confront the first assumption of
the multiple and emphatic denials of kinship presupposed by the factory
farm, and the second as we are introduced to the meat as a speaking
subject. The third assumption, that of a neat, rational and unproblematic
hierarchy of considerability based on intellectual ranking, is
systematically disrupted by Babe and several other characters throughout
the film, and this is one of its best subversive achievements. Thus Babe's
assertion of intelligence and communicative status disrupts Fly's
comfortable assurances to her puppies that 'only stupid animals' are
eaten. This disruption poses ethical and political questions, analogous
to questions arising in post-colonial theory about the role of colonial
hierarchies, about the distinction between meat and non-meat animals,
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and about the nature of the human contract with that special, more
privileged group of animals who can never be 'meat'.
'Babe' is the name of an innocent, an original, Christlike pure soul, to
whom the first news of the dirty secret of meat is eventually revealed in
the outhouse by the revolutionary duck Ferdie - where the meat comes
from, where Babe ('babies') himself comes from, in an act of
disillusionment which neatly parallels that of the human child newly
discovering reproductive and sexual relationships. ('Not the Boss!'
breathes the incredulous Babe, in parallel with the child's shocked 'Not
my parents!') But it is from the malevolent cat that Babe finally learns
the full hurt of the dreadful secret the factory farm and the sinister farm
meathouse hold. The unspeakable is finally spoken: pigs are meat, pigs
are subjects, and pigs suffer the reductive violence which denies,
distances from and hides their subjectivity. Babe is only called 'pig'
while he is alive, but 'they use a different word, "pork or bacon", after
you are dead', explains the satisfied cat, revelling in her privileged,
protected status. As Babe's innocence is stripped away bit by bit, we see
the gradual unveiling of various levels and kinds of animal oppressions
and colonisations - the baring of the 'world of wounds' we all somehow
learn to come to terms with as part of our loss of innocence and 'adult'
accomodation to an oppressive world.
Positioned as counter to these unveilings of oppression are various
emancipatory comments and viewpoints from the animals who appear as
sceptical and critical spectators of the human show. Their comments
deftly expose the politics of the mixed community, especially its human
violence and surrogate dog violence, and the strangeness of human ways.
They give us positive perspectives on the importance of listening to and
being open to others, and on the injustice, distortion and violence of the
exclusionary boundaries which keep Babe positioned as meat. We feel
the thrill of broken chains, the excitement of emancipation as Babe is
gradually enabled to break the boundaries which keep him positioned as
meat, finally crossing the privileged threshold of the house from which
he has been so pointedly excluded to watch television with the farmer
and Babe's surrogate dog mother Fly.
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What I found particularly illuminating here was the exposure of the
levels of hierarchy among animals created by human colonisation in the
small human empire of the farm, an empire which makes concrete human
desire and human will in its social relations and its rational design of the
earth and of the animals themselves. The film displays the key role of
these boundaries of exclusion and levels of hierarchy among animals in
maintaining the practices of meat and the non-subject status of the meat
animal. The dogs, in the canine equivalent of human chauvinism,
attribute their privilege with some complacency to their greater
intelligence, but that facile fabrication is disrupted for us nicely by
Babe's pig intelligence in some of the film's earliest scenes. What is
exposed as unstable, duplicitous and oppressive here is the conventional
boundary and contract on which the relatively privileged status of the pet
and 'house' animal is based, which bears on the privileged status of dogs
and cats in Western society.
Because it reveals the conventionality and instability of the
considerability hierarchy among animals, the film provides us with the
materials to reconstruct the Contract or political origin story for the
privileged group of 'pets' or personal companion animals. In early times,
hunting, farming and shepherding man ('the Boss') in certain societies
made a contract with certain wolves: the contract was that they would be
given a respected role and position very different from that of other
animals, that they would never be meat, in return for help with a critical
task. That task was their active help in the oppression and imprisonment
of other animals, whom they would, using their more-than-human
sensory or physical skills, help confine and construct as meat. In return
for their help in constructing other animals as meat, not only would they
themselves never be meat, they would be 'looked after', given a share of
the meat themselves. Their subjectivity would be recognised, and the
reductive Cartesian conception would never apply to them. The working
animal might often be a 'familiar', like the sheepdogs in Babe, the subject
of a deeply personal relationship, but also accorded the dignity of a coworker and acknowledged for their skilful contribution to economic life.
In the same sense that various human mythic Contracts or founding
political stories are about dividing the spoils, this was a Contract not
only about cooperation in economic life but about mutual benefit in
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meat. But as the disruptions of Babe neatly demonstrate, inclusion in the
contract class has nothing to do with 'intelligence', and everything to do
with complicity.
This Old Contract, originally a cooperative work contract according
privilege in return for complicity in the practice of meat and the
domination or elimination of the non-contract animals, is later under the
Modern Contract extended to the privileged companion animals - the
pets - with whom so many of us continue to share our lives, but extended
in a new form. As production moves out of the household at the
beginning of the modern era, the role of farm-household animals is
transformed in the new separation of public/private in much the same
way as the role of women. Both the working farm wife and the working
farm animal now become subject to the modernist polarity that construes
'rational' economic relationships in alienated, masculinist and narrowly
instrumental terms as hyperseparated from moral and affective familiar
relationships, and affective relationships as occurring in a highly
circumscribed 'private' sphere of altruism supposedly untainted by
economic considerations. The 'familiar' working animal of the contract
class is replaced by the bourgeois 'pet' who, like the bourgeois wife,
leads a sheltered life in a protected private household.12
The hyperseparation between the 'pet' animal and the 'meat' animal is
intensified as the meat animal becomes subject to the rationally
instrumentalised mass-production regime of the factory farm or
laboratory. The 'familiar' animal disappears, and the complementary
polarity of the subjectivised and underemployed 'pet' animal and the
reduced and instrumentalised 'meat' animal takes its place. As Babe
reminds us, the 'familiar' working animal could integrate reason and
emotion, economic and affective, public and private, elements and
exemplify animal skill, difference and mystery.13 In the Old Contract
relationship (at its best), 'familiars' were skilful and respected coworkers, whose economic role was based on their difference from the
human and their consequent ability to extend human senses and human
powers; in the Modern Contract relationship (at its worst), the pet is a
servile toy or dependent lacking both autonomy and mystery, often
conceived in humanised terms as a childlike or inferior self, and for such
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structural reasons increasingly marginal to human lives.14 These are of
course the extremes of a possible continuum, but one that in practice
tends to be configured in response to the political forces underlying the
Old and Modern Contracts. If the pet and the meat tend now to
monopolise the roles these forces have left open, what has disappeared is
the possibility of the animal 'familiars' Babe reimagines for us - the same
animals integrated into our economic as into our affective lives, and at
the same time the possibility of a less alienated form of economic life
which integrates not only the real but the symbolic animal in the form of
affective creativity.
For urban dwellers, which is, increasingly, most of us, animals of the
Modern Contract class of pets usually now represent our main contact
with the animal world. This is unfortunate, because the Modern Contract
defines the pet in opposition to the meat animal and reflects and repeats
many of the duplicities, denials and exclusions involved in the
surrounding western institution of meat. The exclusionary form of the
original contract of complicity in meat is retained and intensified in the
Modern Contract with the pet, usually a carnivore whom the owner
continues to feed on the flesh of other 'meat' animals. The malevolent cat
in Babe is seen thus profiting from the death of the Christmas duck
Rosanna; in real life, non-privileged animals assigned to the 'meat' side
of this dualistic hierarchy die to make meat for the pets of people who
think of themselves unproblematically as animal lovers - kangaroos,
dolphins, penguins, anonymous and rare marine animals in yearly
billions are slaughtered at some remove to feed the cats and dogs whose
own deaths as meat would be unthinkable to their owners.
If the 'pet' is defined in terms of the same Modern Contract that defines
the 'meat' animal, we can understand as complementary constructions the
strongly dualistic boundaries of the 'pet' and 'meat' animal; the pet animal
is a communicative and ethical subject, ideally subject to consideration
and fit for human companionship, the meat animal is none of these
things. If the pet and the meat are complementary polarised aspects of
the same contract, it is this tainted and hidden relationship that enables
our simultaneous claim to love some animals and to have a right to
ruthlessly exploit other animals who are not very different, to
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simultaneously admit pet subjectivity and ignore or deny meat-animal
subjectivity. The Old Contract dignified the role of contract animals, but
presupposed an instrumental relationship to other animals, and this
division becomes a pet/meat dualism in the contract of the modern era.
This genealogy does much to explain the extraordinary contradictions
involved in our contemporary treatment of animals and our claims to
love and respect animals. For example, it is these dualistic contracts that
'animal lovers' honour when they, perhaps even sometimes as vegetarians
or vegans themselves, bring into existence and even breed carnivorous
pet animals whom they feed on the 'meat' of other animals; or whom pet
lovers irresponsibly introduce to inappropriate environments where they
are permitted to make other animals meat and to disrupt carefully
balanced and negotiated communities of free-living animals. The
dualism of the Modern Contract forms the background to such abuses as
the dumping of domestic cats in the wild by 'animal lovers', to become a
menace to indigenous animals in contexts like Australia where there are
few checks and balances.
The moral dualism of both the Old and the Modern Contract helps
construct the taboo against recognising the subjectivity of the meat
animal, as well as the general failure to recognise animal subjectivity,
and produces the moral evasions of meat, especially factory-farmed meat.
Most modern urban dwellers have had some positive experiences with
animals such as dogs or cats, have at some time allowed themselves to
experience them as narrative and communicative subjects rather than as
Cartesian 'machine-animals' or as mindless bodies. But the ethical
dualism and impermeability of this contract boundary prevents them
transferring this awareness to other animals considered 'meat animals' or
to wild animals, reflected in the contradiction of the animal lover's horror
taboo against eating dogs and contrasting indifference or complacency
about the horrific treatment of the 'meat animal'. The recognition drama
of Babe takes us some distance then towards pushing over this key
barrier to a better consciousness of the moral and ecological status of all
animals, showing us how Babe is excluded from contract status as meat,
and how both Babe and the sheep are oppressed by the contract and by
the privilege of the dogs and cats.
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But in another crucial way the film fails to resolve some key ambiguities
surrounding the contract. For we can also read Babe's liberation in the
end of the film as his joining or displacing the dogs in the contract,
recasting him in the role of non-violent communicator with the rest of
the farm animals. Is Babe's liberation then to be set within the Old
Contract's complicity in the oppression of non-contract animals, and the
Modern Contract's dualism of the meat and the pet? Is it merely the
correction of a mistaken individual placement in the hierarchical species
order of rational meritocracy the contracts preserve? Or does it open up a
new possibility: that Babe's liberation can somehow be extended to all
other animals? To the extent that it is an exclusionary contract, in which
some make a living by complicity in instrumentalising, imprisoning and
oppressing others, the contract cannot be extended to provide liberation
for all. The attempt to use such a contract as a basis for liberation only
succeeds in re-erecting the barrier of moral dualism in a new place,
slightly extending the class of persons while leaving the person/property
dualism unquestioned.
Here we come up against the limits imposed by the liberal understanding
of liberation as individual salvation and by its occlusion of its key
underlying dualistic constructions, which applied to the animal sphere
generates the same problems that various human liberation movements
encounter with liberalism. If Babe is to be saved within the limits of
privilege the contracts define, or because he is included in the category
of persons in recognition of his newly-discovered resemblance to the
human and discontinuity from other animals, we can recognise this as the
same colonising contract some forms of liberal feminism have endorsed,
to allow the other to survive at the price of bringing them under the sign
of the Same and to elevate a few through complicity in the oppression of
others. Feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for example, argued
that women should be admitted to the privileged class of political
rightholders in virtue of their discontinuity with allegedly 'lower groups'
such as negro slaves, and their similarity to the master group, elite white
men. The strategy of extending the category of persons without recasting
the person/property dualism in which it is constructed is bound to fail as
an attempt to elevate animals, for exactly the same reasons that similar
liberal feminist strategies were/are bound to fail. The door opens to admit
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a few, but closes to keep the rest outside where they were. One boundary
of moral dualism is momentarily penetrated, but the rest remain in place
or new ones are constructed. So the film apparently displays Babe's
liberation, but leaves us with the big questions about whether Babe will
be admitted alone, with all other pigs, with some other pigs, with all
other animals, or with everything we might consider food?
An anti-anthrocentric culture would, I think, need to reject the colonising
aspects of the Old Contract Babe shows us, in which 'the Boss'
undertakes to allow familiars the meat of other animals that are treated as
beneath moral consideration. But it would need to reject too the Modern
Contract in which 'pet' and 'meat' animals are defined in dualistic terms
as hyper-separated and complementary animal categories, with the hypersubjectivised and emotionally-invested 'pet' privileged over the
undersubjectivised and emotionally-divested 'meat'. Pet/meat dualism
resembles male/female dualism in its complex relationships and
interconnection with other dualisms; thus pet/meat dualism is closely
associated with and draws on several of the major dualisms that define
the economic life of liberal modernity, such as public/private,
reason/emotion, urban/rural and person/property, and there are strong
resonances with race and gender dualisms for these as well as other
reasons.15 Pet/meat dualism may be seen as a special case of the larger
liberal person/property dualism, in which the pet is treated as a de facto
person, marginally recognised in law, and the meat animal is included in
the larger category of animal economic property.
Feminists have argued that a proper understanding of liberalism requires
an understanding of its gendered dimensions in connecting the
public/private, reason/emotion and male/female dualisms16; it might
equally be said that understanding liberalism requires an understanding
of its animal dimensions, in connecting the human/animal, pet/meat
person/property, public/private, and reason/emotion dualisms. We have
already noticed in part 3 that there is a radical kind of inequality and areciprocity in modern commodity practices of meat that is often not
present in the society of the hunter-gatherer, where carnivorous practices
could express not so much superiority to animals as human inclusion
within a common human-animal realm of reciprocal predation and life-
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exchange. So marked is this that 'meat' can be said to have a different
meaning in each of these political contexts. An important implication for
theory of both these sets of observations is that to understand our
contemporary patterns of relationship with animals we need a more
clearly socially and especially politically nuanced and situated analysis
of these categories than is achievable within the confines of an animal
ethics framework. That is why I have used the term 'animal justice'
instead of the terms 'animal rights' or 'animal defence'.
Moving beyond the contracts17 does not imply that we have to forgo all
systematic association with animals, but rather that we have be prepared
to consider carefully the politics of human/animal relationships and test
them against the criterion of realisation in a society where none are
morally excluded and made available for the horrors of the gulag. But if
the concept of the 'pet' is tainted by the same contract and public/private
duality that defines the 'meat', where do we start? I think that the attempt
to negotiate a new communicative model of relationship with animals
could do worse than start from the concept of the 'familiar' Babe makes
visible again, because the 'familiar' relationship escapes some of the
rigidity of the pet/meat dualism; thus the relationship with the working
animal was often strongly communicative, built on a respect for animal
difference, and unified rather than split the rational-economic and
emotional connection with the animal. Your new familiar could be an
animal with whom you form some kind of communicative bond,
friendship, protective relationship, companion-ship, or acquaintance. The
familiar may, if you are very lucky, be a wild free-living animal in your
local surroundings you see sufficiently often to come to know
individually. Relationships with local lizards, birds, and occasionally
friendly mammals like wombats, are examples. Or they may be a
domesticated or semi-domesticated animal with whom you have
economic as well as affective relations not dependent on the moral
exclusion of other animals. These possibilities start to become available
to us once we begin to see beyond the dualisms that underpin the
contracts.
An attempt to rework the 'familiar' relationship for a new time must
clearly reject the familiar's traditionally oppressive roles in relation to
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other animals. But many of the domestic animals who suffered under the
contracts, hens, ducks and geese for example, thrive as human familiars
and can live with us in ways that enable the formation of communicative
relationships, mutual enjoyment, and exploration - without requiring a
further class of excluded animals who exist instrumentally to provide
them with meat.18 We have to ensure that we take responsibility for any
harm our familiars may do to ecological communities or to communities
of free-living animals, whose welfare I believe should, in the event of
conflict, take priority over our desire for animal companions, and in
many if not most contexts this must mean abandoning the fostering of
dogs and cats. Combining this new/old kind of 'familiar' personal and
moral relationship with animals with an economic relationship, as Babe
imagines, is challenging, to say the least, and involves negotiating so
many difficult tensions that it must ultimately lead towards a major
revisioning and restructuring of economic life. But the potential rewards
are great, and such a strategy also indicates routes towards breaking
down those key contemporary versions of reason/emotion and
public/private dualism that help construct the linked forms of alienation
involved in the human workplace and the animal gulag. To the extent
that Babe helps us reimagine the animal as potential familiar rather than
as pet or as meat, it offers us a glimpse of an overgrown but still
discernible path which could begin our journey towards a non-oppressive
form of the mixed community and a livable future respectfully shared
with animals.
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